# Queer IR

A lot of this appears confusing but most of the cards are really straightforward if you read them fully. Good luck! -sam

Thank you very much resident K debater seiji for helping me with this file so that it’s coherent enough to put out <3

A lot of these cards can be swapped/answered by fem IR stuff—so if there’s something you need that’s not in here or if you would like to use those cards it could be very helpful

There are a lot of things I have to say about a lot of cards in this file. If you have questions or thoughts u should discord message me like a true debater

**The unanimous Declaration of the thirteen united States of America,** When in the Course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation.

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.--That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, --That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness. Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shewn, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security.--Such has been the patient sufferance of these Colonies; and such is now the necessity which constrains them to alter their former Systems of Government. The history of the present King of Great Britain is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all having in direct object the establishment of an absolute Tyranny over these States. To prove this, let Facts be submitted to a candid world.

## 1NC

#### The aff’s representation of IR is inherently implicated by gender and sexuality—the ‘perverse homosexual’ in opposition to the ‘sovereign man’

**Weber 2016** (Cynthia Weber is a Professor of International Relations at Sussex University, “*Queer International Relations – Sovereignty, Sexuality, and the Will to Knowledge”*, Chapter 3, Oxford University Press, 2016, accessed 7/17/2022)//sfs

This chapter and the next argue that four figures that consistently appear in the discourse of ‘Western’ / global ‘Northern’ ‘developed’ states as perverse—the ‘underdeveloped’, the ‘undevelopable’, the ‘unwanted immigrant’, and the ‘terrorist’—are among the specific (if surprising) articulations of the ‘perverse homosexual’ in international relations. These particular figurations of the ‘perverse homosexual’ matter for transnational/ global queer studies and international relation because they make possible (by being opposed to) specific figurations of ‘sovereign man’ as ‘(neo) imperial man’ and as ‘(civilizationally) developed man’. All of these figurations of or against ‘sovereign man’ appear to arise out of and in turn produce what Berlant and Warner call heteronormativity, ‘the institutions, structures of understanding, and practical orientations that make heterosexuality seem not only coherent ... but also privileged’ (1998, 548 n. 2). By tracing where, when, and how these ‘perverse homosexuals’ are spoken of in past and ongoing colonial, imperial, and developmental heteronormative discourses that incite them as a concern, stabilize them as a problem, and regulate solutions to the problems they raise through specific policies, these chapters analyze how figurations of the ‘perverse homosexual’ are made to function as instances of ‘statecraft as mancraft’ (Ashley 1989). In these discourses, the ‘perverse homosexual’ is figured as that threat to ‘sovereign man’ who enables the production of (and is produced through) specific order-versus-anarchy binaries. These either/or binaries participate in the regulation of international politics because they establish sexualized orders of international relations. To be clear, I am not arguing that the figure of the ‘homosexual’ as the ‘underdeveloped’, the ‘undevelopable’, the ‘unwanted im/migrant’, and the ‘terrorist’ alone explains all sovereign statecraft as sovereign mancraft. Rather, I am suggesting that if we dig down into the evolutionary theories that produce figurations of and opposed to ‘sovereign man’, what we find is that these theories depend upon understandings of civilization and its relationships to evolutionary time and geopolitical space that are deeply racialized, (dis)ableized, classed, sexed, gendered, and sexualized. This is by no means a new proposition, either empirically or theoretically. For example, even a cursory reading of (neo)imperial discourses and their supporting discourses of racialization makes it explicit that various precursors to and variations of the ‘underdeveloped’ owe their temporal and spatial figurations as perverse in part to how they are coded as perversely sexed, gendered, and sexualized. Institutions and cultural understandings of encumbered versus unencumbered sexuality (Mead 1928), whiteness versus blackness (Fanon 1967), orientalism (Said 1978), savagery and coloniality (Stoler 1995 and 2002), and postcoloniality and imperialism (Spivak 1988) have fueled imaginaries of what came to be known as the ‘underdeveloped’. We see this in figures such as the ‘noble savage’ unencumbered by sexual prohibition in modern Western anthro- pology (Mead 1928), the ‘barbaric savage’ and the ‘colonial’ in Victorian discourse (Stoler 1995 and 2002), the ‘blackman’ marked by race in white colonialism and psychoanalysis (Fanon 1967), ‘the black female body’ (hooks 1982; Hammonds 1999; Spillers 2003), ‘the illiterate peasantry, the tribals, the lowest strata of the urban sub-proletariat’ called the ‘subaltern’ in imperial discourse (Spivak 1988, 283), and ‘the timeless oriental who does not advance with modernity’ in Western discourse (Said 1978), for example. While international relation scholars are increasingly aware of how these figures are produced through complex networks of racialization, (dis) ablization, gender, class, indigeneity, and empire (beginning with Roxanne Doty’s [1996] seminal international relation study of ‘imperial encounters’), they are just beginning to grasp how these figures are also implicated in and produced by complex networks of power/knowledge/pleasure in relation to the figure of the ‘homosexual’. Yet as V. Spike Peterson has long argued (1992, 1999, 2010, 2013, 2014a, 2014b) in her groundbreaking international relation analyses of gender and sexuality, figures like the ‘heterosexual’ and the ‘homosexual’ are foundational to international relation conceptualizations of states, nations, and international politics more widely. My contention in this set of chapters is that figurations of the ‘homosexual’ in Western discourses of statecraft as mancraft and the sexualized organizations of international relations to which they give rise are among those modalities of power/knowledge/pleasure that are the least examined such networks that in part underwrite international relation theories to this day. My suggestion is that to ignore these moves is to not fully understand how international relation theories and practices function, how they can be improved, and how they can be resisted.

#### heteronormative politics justifies US interventionism, war crimes, and systematic discrimination against the LGBTQIA+ community

Emond 18 (Rachel Emond, Herbert Scoville Jr. Peace Fellow at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, University of Tennessee at Chattanooga August 2018, “American foreign policy has a masculinity problem: a discourse analysis of the Iran deal,” pg. 7)//sfs

Men who portray only the ideals of masculinity have historically been rewarded with success in their pursuit of power in American society. The fervor with which our society has held on to this idea of what men should act like has led to what has been coined hegemonic masculinity. Because the men in power portray characteristics like strength and dominance, we associate these terms with what “real” men should act like. Over time, the United States military has used this idea of hegemonic masculinity to draw on who they most want to be the members of the armed forces. The military has consistently portrayed its ideal candidate as an able-bodied male who is both heterosexual and cisgender, someone they can build into a strong, dominant, patriotic man (Locke 2013). Thus military masculinity and hegemonic masculinity have become virtually synonymous with one another, creating a problem when we seek to create soft power policy solutions—characterized as feminine—in opposition to military solutions. We also know of course that the terms listed above do not define the characteristics of all men; or in other words, not all men fit into one classification of masculinity (Paechter 2006; Hoffman 2001; Lansky 2001). Hegemonic masculinity in practice devalues not only women, but also men who do not fit into the idealized version of masculinity. “Masculine gender role training is probably more rigid than its feminine equivalent…men are confined to a much narrower range of acceptable gender performances,” (Lansky 2001) and we can see examples of how this plays out in our society fairly easily. Conservatives heavily ridiculed President Obama, questioned his authenticity, and called him “pathetic” and “weak” after he shed tears when discussing the 2012 Sandy Hook School Shooting (Bobic 2016; Lussenhop 2016). Homosexual men have been systematically discriminated against throughout the history of the military (Sinclair 2009). Up until President Clinton’s 1993 policy of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, homosexual men were strictly banned from the United States military, a policy that presumed that homosexuality inherently rendered someone not masculine enough—or rather, too feminine—to be capable of serving in the military (Sinclair 2009). Even the DADT policy assumes that homosexuality, once known of, has a negative effect on an organization structured on idealized masculinity (Sinclair 2009).

#### Vote NEG to “Queer IR”---enabling affective assemblages that deconstructs the normative conceptions of state-sanctioned militarism

Wilcox 14 (Lauren Wilcox | Associate Professor in Gender Studies, Director of the University of Cambridge Centre for Gender Studies, and a fellow of Selwyn College, Cambridge. | “Queer Theory and the “Proper Objects” of International Relations” pg 612-615 | doi:10.1111/misr.12187 | DOA: 7/21/2022 | SAoki)

An important feature of “Queer IR,” whether or not it is written in the disciplinary spaces of IR, is that the object of study is not necessarily the identities or individual sexual practices of particular individuals. Queer IR challenges heteronormative assumptions in IR theory by arguing that certain actors in global politics can be read as queer; in so doing, such work challenges the dichotomization of masculine and feminine, straight and gay. This reading of international politics as “queer” is echoed in Jasbir Puar’s provocative work of “queer assemblages” which posits queerness in the ability of a terrorist, for example, to defy binary classifications and embrace paradoxes in relation to categories of gender and sexuality (Puar and Rai 2002; Puar 2007). In keeping with queer theory’s critique of sexuality as a stable identity, these works emphasize identifications rather than identities as shifting, fluid, and sometimes contradictory. Judith Butler’s theory of performativity conceptualizes “gender” as a performance of imitation and parody: Gender and sexuality are performances that do not reflect an underlying reality, but materialize reality in ways always unstable and subject to multiple interpretations (Weber 1998a; Butler 1990; Sjoberg, this forum). This approach is exemplified in Cynthia Weber’s reading of “post-phallic” US foreign policy in the Caribbean, in which the United States never really held the phallus in the first place (1999). While her first reading traces the tensions and inconsistencies in the symbolic politics of sexuality and gender, her second reading argues that neither “masculine” or “feminine,” nor “gay” or “straight” are subject positions that can ever be fully occupied—they are always “troubled.” Weber also argues that United States as victim of attack and al-Qaeda as attacker cannot be read as easily as feminized victim and racialized, hypermasculine aggressor. Rather, the sexual/symbolic politics of al-Qaeda are far more complicated: al-Qaeda can be read as feminine in terms of its representation as fluid and unlocatable, but its gender is also changeable as in the hypermasculinity of evil in the figures of the airline hijackers. Al-Qaeda’s sexuality is also ambiguous: while its ideology is of strict heterosexuality in pursuit of a violent homosociality, its global presence makes it open to foreign flows that might penetrate it as well. The America that was under attack on September 11, 2001 can be read not only as feminized homeland, but also the masculine site of the projection of military power (the Pentagon) and World Trade Center as site of neoliberal globalization that is the morally neutral ground for the adjudication of moral claims. Weber refers to this dual symbolic gender and sexuality as “both/ and” and describes it as “queer” in contrast to the “either/or” logic of sexual difference (Weber 2002:143, and also the introduction to this forum). Belkin (2012) performs a similar theoretical move, arguing that US hegemonic military masculinity is not premised upon exclusion and distancing from the feminine and queer, as theorists of hegemonic masculinity have argued. Rather, military masculinity often entails an embrace of these very qualities. In his study of sexuality at US military academies, Belkin argues based on the experience of cadets that being sexually penetrated is not necessarily a feminizing act, but can also be a manly act of endurance, while being forced to penetrate can also be understood as a loss of control and masculinity Shifting Meanings of Queer Another understanding of what it means to “queer” International Relations is found in scholarship that stresses the shifting location of the “queer” subject, noting that “queer” subjects often occupy ambiguous places in societies, rather than purely excluded or stigmatized. Developments such as the US Supreme court ruling laws against “sodomy” unconstitutional, the spread of legal same-sex marriage in many US states, European countries, and elsewhere, and the shift of the dominant LGBT agenda from a radical critique of norms of sexuality, family, and kinship to the emphasis on inclusion and recognition in state institutions of marriage and the military (which has led to the ambivalences describes by Lind in this forum) has also given rise to a critique of “queer liberalism” (Eng 2010). “Queer liberalism” refers to the inclusion of queer subjects as economic subjects and subjects of rights before the law, abetting the erasure of racial difference and as constituting a public of individualism and meritocracy, an image of the subject that, as feminists (and Marxists) have taught, takes for granted the gender and sexual hierarchies of the private sphere. Queer theorists have argued that the inclusion of sexuality as a “private” matter leaves the norms and hierarchies of gender and sexuality beyond political contestation and has played on constructions of monstrous corporealities and sexualities in the production of racialized others. One such critique is Puar’s “homonationalism” thesis, which critiques the “collusion of homosexuality and American nationalism that is generated both by national rhetorics of patriotic inclusion and by gay and queer subjects themselves” (Puar 2007:39). Queer theorists have also coined the phrase “pinkwashing” as an articulation of homonationalism to describe the co-option of white gay people by antiimmigrant and especially anti-Muslim forces in North America, Western Europe, and Israel (Puar 2007; Schulman 2012; Lind, this forum) and critiqued the ways this reproduces discourses of civilization/barbarism. Noting that the figure of “queer” is no longer, if it ever was, solely defined by stigmatization and exclusion, queer theorists of “murderous inclusions” that embody the “both/and” logic of queer theory, in which queer figures can be both included and excluded, can be both rescued and disposable (Haritaworn, Kuntsman, and Posocco 2013a, 2014). In light of such complicated and shifting dynamics of race, gender, sexuality, and nationality, the figure of “the queer” (or “the queer theorist,” for that matter) cannot be taken for granted as an oppositional figure in relation to hegemonic regimes of the state, neoliberalism, or militarism. Theorizing “queer” as an event or a contingent assemblage highlights the salience of the turn to affect, or the complex emotions and attachments through which subjects and alignments are brought into being, which has characterized much of the last decade or so in queer and critical theory writ large. Works such as Ahmed (2004a,b) and others that grew out of queer theorizing14 are engaged with the ways in which emotional, affective investments are shaped by, and inform, public policy and questions of identity, belonging in ways that speak to the burgeoning literature in IR on emotion (Crawford 2000; Fierke 2013; Ross 2006, 2013). In keeping the term “queer” open to its own exclusions, the turn to “affect” builds upon work on the materialization of bodies, publics, and the relations between subjects and norms that queer theory has emphasized into a scholarly and political agenda that challenges contemporary “affective economies” (Ahmed 2004a) and the norms that bring them into being through the formation of sexualities and racializations. The turn to affect is also a critique of certain forms of queer theorizing, in which “queer” is understood as “freedom from norms” as a kind of regulatory ideal that demarcates “proper” queers and excludes other, such as those who assimilate to various heterosexual norms of life as a matter of survival (Ahmed 2004b). Such a model of queer politics ultimately reproduces liberal ideals of individual freedom and choice and reproduces the neoliberal fetish for mobility and flexibility of subjects, excluding certain bodies and certain forms of attachments (Puar 2007:22). Sexuality, understood as a marker of a set of dynamics of (de)humanization and hypervisualization of certain racialized, classed gendered bodies (as in Amar 2013 or gestured to the ambivalences over queer visibility theorized by Lind in this forum) draws our attention to “sexuality” as regimes of desire, danger, and attachments that are not a priori reducible to orientations and identity, and yet nonetheless shape our political conditions of possibility. One such example of this method of queering is Agathangelou et al.’s (2008) critique of violent consequences of neoliberal privatization and the incarceration and killing of racialized bodies, which traces the “circulation and mobilization of feelings of desire, pleasure, fear, and repulsion utilized to all of us into the fold of the state—the various ways in which we become invested emotionally, libidinally, and erotically in global capitalism’s mirages of safety and inclusion” (Agathangelou et al. 2008:122). Another example is Puar’s (2007) and Butler’s (2009) respective critiques of representations of the “sexual abuse” scandal at Abu Ghraib as a statement about Arab or Muslim sexual conservatism and backwardness in opposition to supposedly liberated US sexuality. Queer as “assemblage” calls attention both to the formation of a “terrorist” subject as queer, as well as a method of being “attuned to movements, intensities, emotions, energies, affectivities and textures as they inhabit events, spatialities and corporealities” (Puar 2007:215). Puar’s appropriation of the Deleuzian term “assemblage” for her invocation of “queer assemblages” (2007) is put into productive tension with models of intersectionality which presume that the constituent elements in identity models such as gender, class, race, and sexuality can be disassembled. Such methods seek to shed light upon the “queerness” already present in the world in terms of exclusions/inclusions, brutalities, and differing regimes of living and dying (Haritaworn, Kuntsman, and Posocco 2014), while at the same time also seeking to broaden queer analyses to include an ongoing engagement with shifting identifications, desires, affects, and emotions that shape global politics. Queering IR thus becomes a necessarily open-ended critique of the contingent formations and alignments that set the terms of illegitimate or “unlivable” lives (Butler 2004), as well as a search for the possibilities of life for bodies who fail to inhabit normative conceptions of “the human.”

## links

### ai

#### AI use discriminates based on gender and sexuality—its inherent and irreparable

**Segal 21** (Mark Segal is an American journalist. He is the founder and publisher of Philadelphia Gay News and has won numerous journalism awards for his column "Mark My Words," including best column by The National Newspaper Association, Suburban Newspaper Association and The Society of Professional Journalists, Philadelphia Gay News 03-21-2021, “The homophobia of artificial intelligence”, accessed 7/17/2022, https://epgn.com/2021/03/24/the-homophobia-of-artificial-intelligence/)//sfs

We are all now being profiled by A.I. If you’re on social media, most likely part of your profile includes your face for facial recognition. Facial recognition is already being used by corporations, apartment buildings and even some airports in the U.S. for security. What if this new technology doesn’t recognize you, or what if it recognizes you as LGBT?

Joy Buolamwini, an M.I.T. student working on an A.I. facial recognition project, created a program using A.I. that, when you looked in the mirror in the morning, would show another face that might give you a smile or inspiration, similar to a filter. But the mirror didn’t recognize her. She did discover, unfortunately, that the mirror worked if she wore a white mask. Buolamwini is Black, and what she discovered was that there was discrimination in A.I. This led her to realize that as facial recognition becomes more widely used it would discriminate against dark skinned people. The basic point is that the code for the program can only be as good as those writing it, and sometimes those writing the code write in their own prejudices.

How serious of an issue is this? Amazon discovered that they were getting too many resumes to keep up with by humans, so they brought in an A.I. program to read them and discover which applicants should receive an in-person interview. Someone discovered along the way that only a small percentage of women were being recommended by the algorithm, and if you attended a women’s college or played women’s sports, you didn’t get the interview at all. That’s gender discrimination… done by a computer program, written by a computer programmer who might not even realize they are writing in their own biases.

So now that we know this new technology discriminates by race and gender, can it not also discriminate against you as an LGBT person? Yes, for the same reason. People writing those codes sometimes do not know their own prejudices.

We’ve seen A.I. discriminate against people by their race and by their gender. How long, do you think, before A.I. discriminates based on sexual orientation and gender identity? How long will it be before A.I. is used to reject LGBT applicants from jobs? Or how long it will be before A.I. is used to identify LGBT people in countries where being LGBT is criminalized?

There may be an answer to that question. A Stanford University study of artificial intelligence utilizing a facial recognition algorithm can better choose whether an individual is LGBT than people can. The study is controversial in the tech world, mostly due to those who suggest that facial recognition is based solely on a face structure and don’t take into account that many facial recognition programs add the information about those faces that they received from other sources like social media. Looking at your social media, buying habits and info you’ve given to surveys and employers, do you believe all that material will not point to who you are? Welcome to the future.

### Baudrillard link

#### Their conception of reality is a heteronormative construct masquerading as radical politics – Baudrillard’s fetishization of a pre-modern, “genuine” mode of being excludes queer bodies whose inability to procreate detaches them from the elements of mortality that constitute the real

**Nelson, 15** (Maggie Nelson, professor at Wesleyan, “The Argonauts,” pg. 131)//sfs

For a more disorienting take on the topic, I recommend Jean Baudrillard’s “The Final Solution,” in which Baudrillard argues that assisted forms of reproduction (donor insemination, surrogacy, IVF, etc.), along with the use of contraception, herald the suicide of our species, insofar as they detach reproduction from sex, thus turning us from “mortal, sexed beings” into clone-like messengers of an impossible immortality. So-called artificial insemination, Baudrillard argues, is linked with “the abolition of everything within us that is human, all too human: our desires, our deficiencies, our neuroses, our dreams, our disabilities, our viruses, our lunacies, our unconscious and even our sexuality—all the features which make us specific living beings. Honestly I find it more embarrassing than enraging to read Baudrillard, Žižek, Badiou, and other revered philosophers of the day pontificating on how we might save ourselves from the humanity-annihilating threat of the turkey baster.

### biotech

#### Advancements in biotech reinforce the violent militarism that renders populations disposable

**Agathangelou 17** (Professor Anna M. Agathangelou is a political scientist from York University in Toronto. She is the co-director of Global Change Institute, Cyprus and was a visiting fellow in the Program of Science, Technology and Society at John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard 2014-2015, December 2017, “From the Colonial to Feminist IR: Feminist IR Studies, the Wider FSS/GPE Research Agenda, and the Questions of Value, Valuation, Security, and Violence,” accessed 7/8/2022, pg 739-746. doi:10.1017/S1743923X17000484)//sfs

Our times feature conversations on environmental degradation (Agathangelou 2016; Burke, Fishel, and Mitchell 2016; Mitchell 2016), highlighting how an emergent politic is characterized by the coproduction of morbidity and surplus value. Although advances in biotechnology, from genetically modified organisms to gene editing, from geo-engineering to reducing carbon emissions, "have given us tools to tinker with life itself" (Jasanoff 2016), these inventions (and their corresponding degradations) are unevenly distributed.

Environmental experiments and extermination policies of state bodies, genetic laboratories, military, police agencies, and corporations under the political and economic support and racist social oppression by the upper classes and international corporate elite profitably designate and select flesh, bodies, races, gender, nations, marginalized populations and multiple ecologies as nature for access and generation of value/surplus value. Race, flesh, gender, nations, etc., are constituted as the technologies of hierarchically dividing humanity from nonhumans and the international order by sieving through those who deserve to live and which bodies to turn into the sites of violence with impunity (Agathangelou 2016; Wilderson 2003). FGPE and FSS can grapple with how such production and sorting through of value/valuations and nonvalue/devaluations of biological reproduction work to generate a certain power privilege and security through and within the corporations, the state, the international organizations for some and not others. FGPE and FSS may ask questions about whether capitalism promotes economic extractions as racism. Do idle people, for example, challenge the legitimacy of corporations that presume that their only possibility is work and extraction of value? How so? For instance, a major category such as work is problematized by antislavery feminists as they argue that claims to a fair and equal production do not stand. The system depends on the co-constitution of the "slave," her work and being and extraction for its possibility. What notions of violence are imagined and embodied in the market's and state's authority practices toward the ordering and zoning of peoples in the private and public realms? We might ask questions about how the colonial and racist archives' "accumulated erasures, projections, fabulations and misnamings" (Sharpe 2016, 12) and methods force people into positions that run against what they live everyday, what and how they know.

FGPE and FSS can grapple with the propositional assumptions they share about subjects, species, value, security, land, violence, and freedom: how are certain notions of the "human" tethered to value extraction? And others to value theft? Or how does the agricultural industry come to value (and simultaneously ignore those less than humans' inhabitants who do not possess legal rights) the indigenous populated lands as sparse and mainly for logging and converting to farmland or for sale to realtors worldwide? What form of violence do these enclosures and mostly liberal moral assumptions about territory, land, work coproduce? What form of deaths, privileges and in/security do they make possible?

States, militaries, and corporations depend on our feminist disciplinary inquiry in the making of the international order. The familiar and abstract notions that the state is responsible for its citizens' security and that the market should produce fair and democratic work for all become useful propositions toward the management and governmentality of peoples. Some humans and workers have value; their lands, institutions, and property ought to be secured and protected. Others are selected for access or left to death (and when they work cannot be true workers); they do not register as humans, so violence can happen to them and their ecologies with impunity (i.e., they are seen as empty anyway). A feminist compositional reading, of and by FSS and FGPE, with an attention to race/colonial/neo-colonial apparatus, interrupts normative notions about security and economy, and allow us to consider how we go about producing dominant notions about the zoning of ecologies and people (i.e., those who work and are deserving citizens; those who are idle/criminals/lazy), their management, imprisonment, and decimation. This global materiality could be problematized from the viewpoint of those whose value is extracted daily and whose existence and ecologies are being policed, criminalized, and killed.

### Biotech IR—can also be generic or NATO link

#### “Between 70 and 100 people died in one airstrike… when NATO targeted two fuel tankers… The bodies were mangled beyond recognition; because the bodies were unidentifiable, village elders… distributed one body to match each one lost so they could be buried and grieved. When bodies had run out, the elders gave body parts to families still missing relatives. One man said, ‘I couldn’t find my son, so I took a piece of my flesh with me… and I called it my son’”

Wilcox 15 (Lauren Wilcox | Associate Professor in Gender Studies, Director of the University of Cambridge Centre for Gender Studies, and a fellow of Selwyn College, Cambridge. | *Bodies of Violence Theorizing Embodied Subjects in International Relations* pg 1-4 | DOA: 7/21/2022 | SAoki)

Between 70 and 100 people died in one airstrike in northern Afghanistan in September 2009 when NATO targeted two fuel tankers that the Taliban had hijacked. Having gotten them stuck in a riverbed, the Taliban decided to give them to impoverished villagers who were struggling to stockpile fuel for the winter. The bodies were mangled and scorched beyond recognition; because the bodies were unidentifiable, village elders asked grieving relatives how many family members they had lost, and distributed one body to match each one lost so they could be buried and grieved. When bodies had run out, the elders gave body parts to families still missing relatives. One man said, “I couldn’t find my son, so I took a piece of flesh with me . . . and I called it my son” (Abdul-Ahad 2009). Bodies have long been outside the frame of International Relations (IR)—unrecognizable even as the modes of violence that use, target, and construct bodies in complex ways have proliferated. Drones make it possible to both watch people and bomb them, often killing dozens of civilians as well, while the pilots operating these machines remain thousands of miles away, immune from bodily harm. Suicide bombers seek certain death by turning their bodies into weapons that seem to attack at random. Images of tortured bodies from Guantánamo Bay and Abu Ghraib provoke shock and outrage, and prisoners on hunger strikes to protest their treatment are force-fed. Meanwhile, the management of violence increasingly entails the scrutiny of persons as bodies through biometric technologies [2] Bodies of Violence and “body scanners.” In each of these instances, the body becomes the focal point, central to practices of security and International Relations—the body brought into excruciating pain, the body as weapon, or the body as that which is not to be targeted and hence is hit only accidentally or collaterally. Such bodily focus is quite distinct from prevailing international security practices and the disciplinary ways of addressing those practices in IR. Convention has it that states or groups make war and, in doing so, kill and injure people that other states are charged with protecting. The strategic deployment of force in the language of rational control and risk management that dominates security studies presents a disembodied view of subjects as reasoning actors. However, as objects of security studies, the people who are protected from violence or are killed are understood as only bodies: they are ahistorical, biopolitical aggregations whose individual members breathe, suffer, and die. In both cases, the politics and sociality of bodies are erased. One of the deep ironies of security studies is that while war is actually inflicted on bodies, bodily violence and vulnerability, as the flip side of security, are largely ignored. By contrast, feminist theory is at its most powerful when it denaturalizes accounts of individual subjectivity so as to analyze the relations of force, violence, and language that compose our profoundly unnatural bodies. Security studies lacks the reflexivity necessary to see its contribution to the very context it seeks to domesticate. It has largely ignored work in feminist theory that opens up the forces that have come to compose and constitute the body: by and large, security studies has an unarticulated, yet implicit, conception of bodies as individual organisms whose protection from damage constitutes the provision of security. In IR, human bodies are implicitly theorized as organisms that are exogenously determined—they are relevant to politics only as they live or die. Such bodies are inert objects: they exist to be manipulated, possess no agency, and are only driven by the motivations of agents. Attentive to the relations provoked by both discourse and political forces, feminist theory redirects attention to how both of these compose and produce bodies on terms often alien and unstable. Contemporary feminist theorizing about embodiment provides a provocative challenge to the stability and viability of several key concepts such as sovereignty, security, violence, and vulnerability in IR. In this book, I draw on recent work in feminist theory that offers a challenge to the deliberate maintenance and policing of boundaries and the delineation of human bodies from the broader political context. Challenging this theorization of bodies as natural organisms is a key step in not only exposing how bodies have been implicitly theorized in IR, but in developing a reading of IR that is attentive to the ways in which bodies are both produced and productive. In conceptualizing the subject of IR as essentially disembodied, IR theory impoverishes itself. An explicit focus on the subject as embodied makes two contributions to IR. First, I address the question vexing the humanities and social sciences of how to account for the subject by showing that IR is wrong in its uncomplicated way of thinking about the subject in relation to its embodiment. In its rationalist variants, IR theory comprehends bodies only as inert objects animated by the minds of individuals. Constructivist theory argues that subjects are formed through social relations, but leaves the bodies of subjects outside politics as “brute facts” (Wendt 2001, 110), while many variants of critical theory understand the body as a medium of social power, rather than also a force in its own right. In contrast, feminist theory offers a challenge to the delineation of human bodies from subjects and the broader political context. My central argument is that the bodies that the practices of violence take as their object are deeply political bodies, constituted in reference to historical political conditions while at the same time acting upon our world. The second contribution of this work is to argue that because of the way it theorizes subjects in relation to their embodiment, IR is also lacking in one of its primary purposes: theorizing international political violence. This project argues that violence is more than a strategic action of rational actors (as in rationalist theories) or a destructive violation of community laws and norms (as in liberal and constructivist theories). Because IR conventionally theorizes bodies as outside politics and irrelevant to subjectivity, it cannot see how violence can be understood as a creative force for shaping the limits of how we understand ourselves as political subjects, as well as forming the boundaries of our bodies and political communities. Understanding how “war is a generative force like no other” (Barkawi and Brighton 2011, 126) requires us to pay attention to how bodies are killed and injured, but also formed, re-formed, gendered, and racialized through the bodily relations of war; it also requires that we consider how bodies are enabling and generative of war and practices of political violence more broadly. Security studies, the subfield of IR that focuses on violence, has defined its topic of study as “the study of the threat, use, and control of military force” (Walt 1991, 212), with emphasis on the causes of war and the conditions for peace. Despite the traditional focus on military force, security studies has by and large ignored the bodies that are the intended or inevitable targets of the use of such force. One classic work in the field, Schelling’s Arms and Influence (1966), specifically addresses coercion as the threat to cause pain and to hurt human bodies in order to manipulate a certain outcome. Few works are so explicit—that force involves the threat or use of military power to hurt and kill human bodies is usually implicit in security studies. Furthermore, when the violence to human bodies is made explicit, as in Schelling, such bodies are implicitly theorized precisely as organisms that can be hurt or killed. Contributing to the neglect of theorizing bodies has been the emphasis placed on national security. National security has long been the center of analysis in security studies, but in recent decades, the field has broadened to consider the referent object of security to be the individual, as “people represent, in one sense, the irreducible basic unit to which the concept of security can be applied” (Buzan 1991, 18). The concept of “human security” posits the question of violence against human bodies as a central issue in security studies, yet this theorization accepts the individual as an exogenous unit of analysis. The relationship between bodies, subjects, and violence still remains under-theorized, a matter at least partly related to the ways in which the conduct of war and political violence, as violent social practices, have been written out of the field of IR and, in particular, out of security studies as a subfield (Barkawi 2011). This lacuna has been noted, if rarely explored in depth: “the absence of bodies in the discourses of a discipline that was borne of a concern with war and hence violence against bodies, itself raises curiosity as to the conditions of possibility that enabled this absence” (Jabri 2006b, 825). This work addresses this absence and aims to show what taking bodies seriously would mean to the study of violence in IR

### heg

#### US hegemony projects heterosexuality while projecting “national self-interest”- the result is queer persecution

**Agathangelou and Ling, 4** – Anna M., Associate Professor at York University, Visting Research Fellow, Program on Science, Technology and Society at Harvard University, L. H. M., Professor in the Graduate Program in International Affairs at The New School, The House of IR: From Family Power Politics to the Poisies of Worldism, International Studies Review, vol. 6, no. 4, pg. 21-49, jstor – \*edited for problematic language

How the United States would constitute this "third space" is beside the point here. What the rulers of the house cannot forgive is such an expose of skulking desires in the liberal-realist state. It is shown to project a public heterosexuality that wants to consume and be loved by Others even when, as Weber points out, the objects of strategic desire switch national gender identities, as with Castro's Cuba. Calls for protecting the "national self-interest" take on a wholly different meaning from that of "objective," "rational" calculations of "ordered prefer- ences" as propounded by liberals, realists, and their "good" progeny. Instead, war, occupation, and other strategies for "regime change" turn into simula- tions, rather than actual exertions, of power. Such put-ons of fake power seem all the more pathetic, Weber concludes, given their dildo-like artificiality and neediness.

### IR

#### The aff’s representation of IR is inherently implicated by gender and sexuality—the ‘perverse homosexual’ in opposition to the ‘sovereign man’

**Weber 2016** (Cynthia Weber is a Professor of International Relations at Sussex University, “*Queer International Relations – Sovereignty, Sexuality, and the Will to Knowledge”*, Chapter 3, Oxford University Press, 2016, accessed 7/17/2022)//sfs

This chapter and the next argue that four figures that consistently appear in the discourse of ‘Western’ / global ‘Northern’ ‘developed’ states as perverse—the ‘underdeveloped’, the ‘undevelopable’, the ‘unwanted immigrant’, and the ‘terrorist’—are among the specific (if surprising) articulations of the ‘perverse homosexual’ in international relations. These particular figurations of the ‘perverse homosexual’ matter for transnational/ global queer studies and international relation because they make possible (by being opposed to) specific figurations of ‘sovereign man’ as ‘(neo) imperial man’ and as ‘(civilizationally) developed man’. All of these figurations of or against ‘sovereign man’ appear to arise out of and in turn produce what Berlant and Warner call heteronormativity, ‘the institutions, structures of understanding, and practical orientations that make heterosexuality seem not only coherent ... but also privileged’ (1998, 548 n. 2). By tracing where, when, and how these ‘perverse homosexuals’ are spoken of in past and ongoing colonial, imperial, and developmental heteronormative discourses that incite them as a concern, stabilize them as a problem, and regulate solutions to the problems they raise through specific policies, these chapters analyze how figurations of the ‘perverse homosexual’ are made to function as instances of ‘statecraft as mancraft’ (Ashley 1989). In these discourses, the ‘perverse homosexual’ is figured as that threat to ‘sovereign man’ who enables the production of (and is produced through) specific order-versus-anarchy binaries. These either/or binaries participate in the regulation of international politics because they establish sexualized orders of international relations. To be clear, I am not arguing that the figure of the ‘homosexual’ as the ‘underdeveloped’, the ‘undevelopable’, the ‘unwanted im/migrant’, and the ‘terrorist’ alone explains all sovereign statecraft as sovereign mancraft. Rather, I am suggesting that if we dig down into the evolutionary theories that produce figurations of and opposed to ‘sovereign man’, what we find is that these theories depend upon understandings of civilization and its relationships to evolutionary time and geopolitical space that are deeply racialized, (dis)ableized, classed, sexed, gendered, and sexualized. This is by no means a new proposition, either empirically or theoretically. For example, even a cursory reading of (neo)imperial discourses and their supporting discourses of racialization makes it explicit that various precursors to and variations of the ‘underdeveloped’ owe their temporal and spatial figurations as perverse in part to how they are coded as perversely sexed, gendered, and sexualized. Institutions and cultural understandings of encumbered versus unencumbered sexuality (Mead 1928), whiteness versus blackness (Fanon 1967), orientalism (Said 1978), savagery and coloniality (Stoler 1995 and 2002), and postcoloniality and imperialism (Spivak 1988) have fueled imaginaries of what came to be known as the ‘underdeveloped’. We see this in figures such as the ‘noble savage’ unencumbered by sexual prohibition in modern Western anthro- pology (Mead 1928), the ‘barbaric savage’ and the ‘colonial’ in Victorian discourse (Stoler 1995 and 2002), the ‘blackman’ marked by race in white colonialism and psychoanalysis (Fanon 1967), ‘the black female body’ (hooks 1982; Hammonds 1999; Spillers 2003), ‘the illiterate peasantry, the tribals, the lowest strata of the urban sub-proletariat’ called the ‘subaltern’ in imperial discourse (Spivak 1988, 283), and ‘the timeless oriental who does not advance with modernity’ in Western discourse (Said 1978), for example. While international relation scholars are increasingly aware of how these figures are produced through complex networks of racialization, (dis) ablization, gender, class, indigeneity, and empire (beginning with Roxanne Doty’s [1996] seminal international relation study of ‘imperial encounters’), they are just beginning to grasp how these figures are also implicated in and produced by complex networks of power/knowledge/pleasure in relation to the figure of the ‘homosexual’. Yet as V. Spike Peterson has long argued (1992, 1999, 2010, 2013, 2014a, 2014b) in her groundbreaking international relation analyses of gender and sexuality, figures like the ‘heterosexual’ and the ‘homosexual’ are foundational to international relation conceptualizations of states, nations, and international politics more widely. My contention in this set of chapters is that figurations of the ‘homosexual’ in Western discourses of statecraft as mancraft and the sexualized organizations of international relations to which they give rise are among those modalities of power/knowledge/pleasure that are the least examined such networks that in part underwrite international relation theories to this day. My suggestion is that to ignore these moves is to not fully understand how international relation theories and practices function, how they can be improved, and how they can be resisted.

## impact

### interventionism

#### heteronormative politics justifies US interventionism, war crimes, and systematic discrimination against the LGBTQIA+ community

Emond 18 (Rachel Emond, Herbert Scoville Jr. Peace Fellow at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, University of Tennessee at Chattanooga August 2018, “American foreign policy has a masculinity problem: a discourse analysis of the Iran deal,” pg. 7)//sfs

Men who portray only the ideals of masculinity have historically been rewarded with success in their pursuit of power in American society. The fervor with which our society has held on to this idea of what men should act like has led to what has been coined hegemonic masculinity. Because the men in power portray characteristics like strength and dominance, we associate these terms with what “real” men should act like. Over time, the United States military has used this idea of hegemonic masculinity to draw on who they most want to be the members of the armed forces. The military has consistently portrayed its ideal candidate as an able-bodied male who is both heterosexual and cisgender, someone they can build into a strong, dominant, patriotic man (Locke 2013). Thus military masculinity and hegemonic masculinity have become virtually synonymous with one another, creating a problem when we seek to create soft power policy solutions—characterized as feminine—in opposition to military solutions. We also know of course that the terms listed above do not define the characteristics of all men; or in other words, not all men fit into one classification of masculinity (Paechter 2006; Hoffman 2001; Lansky 2001). Hegemonic masculinity in practice devalues not only women, but also men who do not fit into the idealized version of masculinity. “Masculine gender role training is probably more rigid than its feminine equivalent…men are confined to a much narrower range of acceptable gender performances,” (Lansky 2001) and we can see examples of how this plays out in our society fairly easily. Conservatives heavily ridiculed President Obama, questioned his authenticity, and called him “pathetic” and “weak” after he shed tears when discussing the 2012 Sandy Hook School Shooting (Bobic 2016; Lussenhop 2016). Homosexual men have been systematically discriminated against throughout the history of the military (Sinclair 2009). Up until President Clinton’s 1993 policy of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, homosexual men were strictly banned from the United States military, a policy that presumed that homosexuality inherently rendered someone not masculine enough—or rather, too feminine—to be capable of serving in the military (Sinclair 2009). Even the DADT policy assumes that homosexuality, once known of, has a negative effect on an organization structured on idealized masculinity (Sinclair 2009).

## alts

### 👻 hauntology 👻

#### vote neg to endorse queer hauntology 👻

**Freccero 06** (Carla Freccero is Chair of the Department of Literature and Professor of Literature, History of Consciousness, and Women’s Studies at the University of California, Santa Cruz. January 16 2006, “Queer/Early/Modern,” accessed 7/8/2022, pg. 75-80, IBSN:9780822387169, 0822387166)//sfs

Yet this intertwining of multiple brutal logics of erasure reappears again and again. The historical and political appropriation of ‘‘Brandon Teena’’ as ‘‘known’’ cannot lay to rest the haunting that persistently destabilizes the anchors of identity and meaning. As Halberstam explains, if ‘‘haunting is an articulate discourse’’ and ‘‘a mode within which the ghost demands something like accountability,’’ then ‘‘to tell a ghost story means being willing to be haunted’’ (73). This willingness to be haunted is an ethical relation to the world, motivated by a concern not only for the past but also for the future, for those who live on in the borderlands without a home. If the queer appropriation of ‘‘Brandon Teena’’ has been melancholic—an attempt to deal with trauma, in a sense, by refusing it as such, turning it instead into knowledge, into productive organizing—it has also been colonizing. Both gestures, the melancholic and the colonizing, have worked to foreclose how ‘‘he,’’ as ghost, recurs in ways that are not so clear, and demands not a definition but the creation of a future where categorical definitions so dependent on gender and desire might prove affirmingly impossible and unnecessary. Using spectrality as a hypothesis, then, we might wonder what we would see and hear were we to remain open to ‘‘Brandon Teena’’ ’s ghostly returns. One such moment is the point at which one survivor, finding himself haunted, ‘‘listens’’ to the ghost and speaks its reminder. Matthew Shepard’s homophobically motivated murder occurred in 1998, four years after ‘‘Brandon Teena’’ was killed and the year a documentary of the events The Brandon Teena Story—was released; it also occurred four months after the torture and murder of James Byrd in Jasper, Texas, for being African American. In a statement bordering on the wishes thus express themselves from beyond the grave. Tellingly, the ghostly performative ventriloquized by Mr. Shepard, as reported in the Washington Post, interrupts the logic of revenge and retribution animating the force of the law: In a dramatic and surprising end to the Matthew Shepard murder case, convicted killer Aaron J. McKinney, 22, today was sentenced to two life sentences for beating the gay University of Wyoming student to death last year. McKinney accepted a deal brokered by Shepard’s parents just as a jury was about to begin hearing testimony about whether he should be put to death.... His son, Shepard said, believed in the death penalty for certain crimes, and had called it justified in the racially motivated murder in Texas of James Byrd Jr., who was dragged to death behind a pickup truck in another hate crime that shocked the nation’s conscience. ‘‘Little did we know that the same response would come about involving Matt,’’ Shepard said. ‘‘I too believe in the death penalty,’’ he added. ‘‘I would like nothing better than to see you die, Mr. McKinney. However, this is the time to begin the healing process. To show mercy to someone who refused to show any mercy. ‘‘Mr. McKinney, I’m going to grant you life, as hard as it is for me to do so, because of Matthew . . .’’18 Ghostly returns are thus a sign of trauma and its mourning.19 This trauma, Derrida argues, is a ‘‘politico-logic of trauma,’’ that ‘‘répond à l’injonction d’une justice qui, au-delà du droit, surgit dans le respect même de qui n’est pas, n’est plus ou n’est pas encore vivant, présentement vivant’’ (‘‘responds to the injunction of a justice which, beyond right or law, rises up in the very respect owed to whoever is not, no longer or not yet, living, presently living’’).20 This mourning is not a form of nostalgia, a longing for what is gone, but a kind of mourning that is ‘‘en fait et en droit interminable, sans normalité possible, sans limite fiable, dans la réalité ou dans le concept, entre l’introjection et l’incorporation’’ (160; ‘‘in fact and by right interminable, without possible normality, without reliable limit, in its reality or in its concept, between introjection and incorporation,’’ 97).21 Thinking historicity through haunting thus combines both the seeming objectivity of events and the subjectivity of their affective afterlife. As Wendy Brown remarks of spectrality’s modality—what Derrida calls a ‘‘being-with specters’’ that is also ‘‘une politique de la mémoire, de l’héritage et des générations’’ (15; ‘‘a politics of memory, of inheritance, and of generations’’ [xviii–xix])—‘‘We inherit not ‘what really happened’ to the dead but what lives on from that happening, what is conjured from it, how past generations and events occupy the force fields of the present, how they claim us, and how they haunt, plague, and inspirit our imaginations and visions for the future.’’22 Ghostliness and homosexuality have a long history of association, most frequently referenced in the clichéd and homophobic phrase ‘‘the specter of homosexuality.’’ In its most virulent deployment, that specter is always lurking in an alley or behind a bush, waiting to pounce upon some unsuspecting innocents. When invoked more sympathetically, it hovers secretively around the edges of an otherwise perfectly straight and open—albeit presumably anxious—scene. Indeed, Derrida defines the specter in terms strikingly reminiscent of homosexual panic, the sense of a not-quite-visible contaminating near-presence that is also an anxious, often paranoid projection, the material immateriality I tracked through the term queer in chapter 2: Le spectre, comme son nom l’indique, c’est la fréquence d’une certaine visibilité. Mais la visibilité de l’invisible. Et la visibilité, par essence, ne se voit pas, c’est pourquoi elle reste . . . au-delà du phénomène ou de l’étant. Le spectre, c’est aussi, entre autres choses, ce qu’on imagine, ce qu’on croit voir et qu’on projette: sur un écran imaginaire, là où il n’y a rien à voir. Pas même l’écran, parfois, et un écran a toujours, au fond, au fond qu’il est, une structure, une structure d’apparition disparaissante. Mais voilà qu’on ne peut plus fermer l’oeil à guetter le retour. (Spectres de Marx, 165) The specter, as its name indicates, is the frequency of a certain visibility. But the visibility of the invisible. And visibility, by its essence, is not seen, which is why it remains . . . beyond the phenomenon, or beyond being. The specter is also, among other things, what one thinks one sees, and which one projects—on an imaginary screen where there is nothing to see. Not even the screen sometimes, and a screen always has, at bottom, in the bottom or background that is, a structure of disappearing apparition. But now one can no longer get any shut-eye, being so intent to watch out for the return. (Specters of Marx, 101) Like the closet, whose very existence suggests the opening onto what is concealed, Derrida likens the specter to the screen whose structure is always already that of a disappearing appearance. The ghost is thus also structural. Terry Castle observes this phenomenon in relation to the ‘‘apparitional’’ history of the lesbian: ‘‘When it comes to lesbians . . . many people have trouble seeing what’s in front of them. The lesbian remains a kind of ‘ghost effect’ in the cinema world of modern life: elusive, vaporous, difficult to spot—even when she is there, in plain view, mortal and magnificent, at the center of the screen. Some may even deny that she exists at all.’’23 For those who live ‘‘on the other side’’ of the expression, ‘‘the specter of homosexuality,’’ those who might be said to be named, ‘‘ghosted’’ by that phrase, ghosts are neither scary nor menacing, however terrifying the prospect of being turned into one might be. For one may also reverse the perspective and understand the specter as that which sees without being seen, as what produces the sense of being seen, observed, surveilled.24 Hélène Cixous declared, concerning one famous gynephobic patriarchal figure of woman, ‘‘You only have to look at the Medusa straight on to see her. And she’s not deadly. She’s beautiful and she’s laughing.’’25 To be a ghost among ghosts is to ‘‘see’’ the ghost not as a feared and fearful projection—the way Medusa cannot be directly seen by men—but perhaps as beautiful, though rarely laughing, for the specter is the form a certain unfinished mourning takes. Thus part of what it might mean to live with ghosts would be to understand oneself as ‘‘ghosted,’’ and to understand ‘‘learning to live’’ as something that takes place ‘‘between life and death’’ as the ‘‘non contemporaneity with itself of the living present.’’26 This would then be an approach to history—and to justice—that would neither ‘‘forget the dead’’ nor ‘‘successfully’’ mourn them.27 Exploring further the notion of haunting as the way history registers as affect in the social and psychic lives of beings, and the reciprocity of haunting and being haunted, Avery Gordon follows the figure of the ghost and the poetics of haunting in other contexts to understand the specificity of this way of coming to terms with historical trauma.28 Ghostly Matters looks to Toni Morrison’s Beloved to see how haunting conveys the traumatic effect and affect of the historical event on the subject and the social responsibility that is thereby entailed.29 Thus what Derrida analyzes in the work of Marx and philosophy, Gordon studies in a kind of embodied poetics, tracking how the ghost’s figurative ‘‘materialization’’ elicits, even as it emblematizes, traumatic repetition and working through.30 In that process of materialization, or poetic embodiment, Hamlet’s father undergoes a morphological transformation, from Danish king to African slave and from father to daughter; the ghostly exchange takes place not between a father and his son but between a daughter and her mother; and the ‘‘allegory’’ of haunting moves from Europe to America.31 Like Gordon, in what follows I track a transatlantic passage from an earlier moment and an earlier historical trauma as they haunt both within and outside of their own time. In Premodern Sexualities, Louise Fradenburg and I raised questions concerning the fantasmatic relationship that we, as scholars of the past and scholars working ‘‘queerly’’ in the history of sexuality, might affirm in relation to the past, ‘‘ours’’ or that of others, in the name of pleasure.32 It was an effort, in part, to honor the complex pleasure positivity of queer theory in its resistance to the heteronormatively disciplining discourses that came self-righteously to the fore when aids in the United States became associated with ‘‘homosexuals’’ and ‘‘promiscuity.’’ It was also a way of examining how desires and identifications—queer theory’s psychoanalytically inflected terminological legacies—are at work in historical scholars’ investments in the differences and similarities between the past and the present. Finally, it was a way of noting historiography’s own (self-)disciplining force, its ‘‘repudiations of pleasure and fantasy’’ in spite—or because—of its queer wishes (xvii); thus we argued for a queer historiography that would devote itself to a critical revalorization of the places and possibilities of pleasure within the serious and ‘‘ascetic’’ work of history. Insofar as queer historicism registers the affective investments of the present in the past, however, it harbors within itself not only pleasure, but also pain, a traumatic pain whose ethical insistence is to ‘‘live to tell’’ through complex and circuitous processes of working through. Thus we concluded the introduction with an ethically impelled wish: The past may not be the present, but it is sometimes in the present, haunting, even if only through our uncertain knowledges of it, our hopes of surviving and living well. The questions we are raising about the practice of history may help us understand better the living and dying of twentieth-century bodies and pleasures. And we hope that consideration of the ways in which historicisms are currently questioning sexuality, and sex studies questioning historicism, will work to affirm the pleasures of mortal creatures. (xxi) The past is in the present in the form of a haunting. This is what, among other things, doing a queer kind of history means, since it involves an openness to the possibility of being haunted, even inhabited, by ghosts. What is transmitted in the cohabitation of ghostly past and present is related to survival, to ‘‘living well,’’ and to the ‘‘pleasures of mortal creatures,’’ survivals and pleasures that have little to do with normative understandings of biological reproduction.

### queer IR—deconstruct/reconstruct statecraft

#### The alternative is a queer logic of statecraft—we reconstruct the research object of the 1AC

**Thiel 2018** (Markus Thiel, assistant professor in the Department of Politics and International Relations at Florida International University, Miami & research associate at Miami-FIU’s EU Center of Excellence, Sage Journals 01-07-2018, “Introducing Queer Theory in International Relations,” accessed 07-21-2022, https://www.e-ir.info/2018/01/07/queer-theory-in-international-relations/)//sfs

Tensions between mainstream advocacy and radical queer approaches signify the need to rethink simplistic IR analytical approaches. Political tensions in the ‘real’ world prompt the queer IR theorist to question generally accepted, established conceptions of international governance. In doing so, queer theorists use existing literature or audio-visual material such as movies or even performances to go beyond the apparently obvious to deconstruct and then reconstruct IR events and processes. They often exhibit a critical perspective towards naturally assumed conditions of space and time that tend to conceal and flatten differences among actors and interpretations of international events. For example, Cynthia Weber (2016) uses Hillary Clinton’s sexual rights speech at the United Nations in 2011 and contrasts it with Conchita Wurst’s winning performance at the Eurovision song contest in 2014 to highlight a ‘queer logic of statecraft’ that contests traditional, gendered and binary approaches to governance. Weber highlights how despite transforming the notion of the homosexual from deviant into normal rights-holder in her speech, Clinton still produced an international binary of progressive versus intolerant states. On the other hand, Conchita Wurst – a character created by Thomas Neuwirth – challenged accepted notions of what is considered normal or perverse by performing in drag with a beard. In the course of this, Wurst destabilised racial, sexual, gendered and geo- political notions of what it means to be a European. Taken together, both cases show how seemingly stable ideas in international relations are far from natural. Instead, they are intentionally created, normalised, challenged and reconfigured.

### Queer(ing) IR

#### Vote NEG to “Queer IR”---enabling affective assemblages that deconstructs the normative conceptions of state-sanctioned militarism

Wilcox 14 (Lauren Wilcox | Associate Professor in Gender Studies, Director of the University of Cambridge Centre for Gender Studies, and a fellow of Selwyn College, Cambridge. | “Queer Theory and the “Proper Objects” of International Relations” pg 612-615 | doi:10.1111/misr.12187 | DOA: 7/21/2022 | SAoki)

An important feature of “Queer IR,” whether or not it is written in the disciplinary spaces of IR, is that the object of study is not necessarily the identities or individual sexual practices of particular individuals. Queer IR challenges heteronormative assumptions in IR theory by arguing that certain actors in global politics can be read as queer; in so doing, such work challenges the dichotomization of masculine and feminine, straight and gay. This reading of international politics as “queer” is echoed in Jasbir Puar’s provocative work of “queer assemblages” which posits queerness in the ability of a terrorist, for example, to defy binary classifications and embrace paradoxes in relation to categories of gender and sexuality (Puar and Rai 2002; Puar 2007). In keeping with queer theory’s critique of sexuality as a stable identity, these works emphasize identifications rather than identities as shifting, fluid, and sometimes contradictory. Judith Butler’s theory of performativity conceptualizes “gender” as a performance of imitation and parody: Gender and sexuality are performances that do not reflect an underlying reality, but materialize reality in ways always unstable and subject to multiple interpretations (Weber 1998a; Butler 1990; Sjoberg, this forum). This approach is exemplified in Cynthia Weber’s reading of “post-phallic” US foreign policy in the Caribbean, in which the United States never really held the phallus in the first place (1999). While her first reading traces the tensions and inconsistencies in the symbolic politics of sexuality and gender, her second reading argues that neither “masculine” or “feminine,” nor “gay” or “straight” are subject positions that can ever be fully occupied—they are always “troubled.” Weber also argues that United States as victim of attack and al-Qaeda as attacker cannot be read as easily as feminized victim and racialized, hypermasculine aggressor. Rather, the sexual/symbolic politics of al-Qaeda are far more complicated: al-Qaeda can be read as feminine in terms of its representation as fluid and unlocatable, but its gender is also changeable as in the hypermasculinity of evil in the figures of the airline hijackers. Al-Qaeda’s sexuality is also ambiguous: while its ideology is of strict heterosexuality in pursuit of a violent homosociality, its global presence makes it open to foreign flows that might penetrate it as well. The America that was under attack on September 11, 2001 can be read not only as feminized homeland, but also the masculine site of the projection of military power (the Pentagon) and World Trade Center as site of neoliberal globalization that is the morally neutral ground for the adjudication of moral claims. Weber refers to this dual symbolic gender and sexuality as “both/ and” and describes it as “queer” in contrast to the “either/or” logic of sexual difference (Weber 2002:143, and also the introduction to this forum). Belkin (2012) performs a similar theoretical move, arguing that US hegemonic military masculinity is not premised upon exclusion and distancing from the feminine and queer, as theorists of hegemonic masculinity have argued. Rather, military masculinity often entails an embrace of these very qualities. In his study of sexuality at US military academies, Belkin argues based on the experience of cadets that being sexually penetrated is not necessarily a feminizing act, but can also be a manly act of endurance, while being forced to penetrate can also be understood as a loss of control and masculinity Shifting Meanings of Queer Another understanding of what it means to “queer” International Relations is found in scholarship that stresses the shifting location of the “queer” subject, noting that “queer” subjects often occupy ambiguous places in societies, rather than purely excluded or stigmatized. Developments such as the US Supreme court ruling laws against “sodomy” unconstitutional, the spread of legal same-sex marriage in many US states, European countries, and elsewhere, and the shift of the dominant LGBT agenda from a radical critique of norms of sexuality, family, and kinship to the emphasis on inclusion and recognition in state institutions of marriage and the military (which has led to the ambivalences describes by Lind in this forum) has also given rise to a critique of “queer liberalism” (Eng 2010). “Queer liberalism” refers to the inclusion of queer subjects as economic subjects and subjects of rights before the law, abetting the erasure of racial difference and as constituting a public of individualism and meritocracy, an image of the subject that, as feminists (and Marxists) have taught, takes for granted the gender and sexual hierarchies of the private sphere. Queer theorists have argued that the inclusion of sexuality as a “private” matter leaves the norms and hierarchies of gender and sexuality beyond political contestation and has played on constructions of monstrous corporealities and sexualities in the production of racialized others. One such critique is Puar’s “homonationalism” thesis, which critiques the “collusion of homosexuality and American nationalism that is generated both by national rhetorics of patriotic inclusion and by gay and queer subjects themselves” (Puar 2007:39). Queer theorists have also coined the phrase “pinkwashing” as an articulation of homonationalism to describe the co-option of white gay people by antiimmigrant and especially anti-Muslim forces in North America, Western Europe, and Israel (Puar 2007; Schulman 2012; Lind, this forum) and critiqued the ways this reproduces discourses of civilization/barbarism. Noting that the figure of “queer” is no longer, if it ever was, solely defined by stigmatization and exclusion, queer theorists of “murderous inclusions” that embody the “both/and” logic of queer theory, in which queer figures can be both included and excluded, can be both rescued and disposable (Haritaworn, Kuntsman, and Posocco 2013a, 2014). In light of such complicated and shifting dynamics of race, gender, sexuality, and nationality, the figure of “the queer” (or “the queer theorist,” for that matter) cannot be taken for granted as an oppositional figure in relation to hegemonic regimes of the state, neoliberalism, or militarism. Theorizing “queer” as an event or a contingent assemblage highlights the salience of the turn to affect, or the complex emotions and attachments through which subjects and alignments are brought into being, which has characterized much of the last decade or so in queer and critical theory writ large. Works such as Ahmed (2004a,b) and others that grew out of queer theorizing14 are engaged with the ways in which emotional, affective investments are shaped by, and inform, public policy and questions of identity, belonging in ways that speak to the burgeoning literature in IR on emotion (Crawford 2000; Fierke 2013; Ross 2006, 2013). In keeping the term “queer” open to its own exclusions, the turn to “affect” builds upon work on the materialization of bodies, publics, and the relations between subjects and norms that queer theory has emphasized into a scholarly and political agenda that challenges contemporary “affective economies” (Ahmed 2004a) and the norms that bring them into being through the formation of sexualities and racializations. The turn to affect is also a critique of certain forms of queer theorizing, in which “queer” is understood as “freedom from norms” as a kind of regulatory ideal that demarcates “proper” queers and excludes other, such as those who assimilate to various heterosexual norms of life as a matter of survival (Ahmed 2004b). Such a model of queer politics ultimately reproduces liberal ideals of individual freedom and choice and reproduces the neoliberal fetish for mobility and flexibility of subjects, excluding certain bodies and certain forms of attachments (Puar 2007:22). Sexuality, understood as a marker of a set of dynamics of (de)humanization and hypervisualization of certain racialized, classed gendered bodies (as in Amar 2013 or gestured to the ambivalences over queer visibility theorized by Lind in this forum) draws our attention to “sexuality” as regimes of desire, danger, and attachments that are not a priori reducible to orientations and identity, and yet nonetheless shape our political conditions of possibility. One such example of this method of queering is Agathangelou et al.’s (2008) critique of violent consequences of neoliberal privatization and the incarceration and killing of racialized bodies, which traces the “circulation and mobilization of feelings of desire, pleasure, fear, and repulsion utilized to all of us into the fold of the state—the various ways in which we become invested emotionally, libidinally, and erotically in global capitalism’s mirages of safety and inclusion” (Agathangelou et al. 2008:122). Another example is Puar’s (2007) and Butler’s (2009) respective critiques of representations of the “sexual abuse” scandal at Abu Ghraib as a statement about Arab or Muslim sexual conservatism and backwardness in opposition to supposedly liberated US sexuality. Queer as “assemblage” calls attention both to the formation of a “terrorist” subject as queer, as well as a method of being “attuned to movements, intensities, emotions, energies, affectivities and textures as they inhabit events, spatialities and corporealities” (Puar 2007:215). Puar’s appropriation of the Deleuzian term “assemblage” for her invocation of “queer assemblages” (2007) is put into productive tension with models of intersectionality which presume that the constituent elements in identity models such as gender, class, race, and sexuality can be disassembled. Such methods seek to shed light upon the “queerness” already present in the world in terms of exclusions/inclusions, brutalities, and differing regimes of living and dying (Haritaworn, Kuntsman, and Posocco 2014), while at the same time also seeking to broaden queer analyses to include an ongoing engagement with shifting identifications, desires, affects, and emotions that shape global politics. Queering IR thus becomes a necessarily open-ended critique of the contingent formations and alignments that set the terms of illegitimate or “unlivable” lives (Butler 2004), as well as a search for the possibilities of life for bodies who fail to inhabit normative conceptions of “the human.”

#### “queering IR” creates cracks in the boundaries that allows us to imagine the world in terms other than nationalism

**Kangas et al 18** (Anni Kangas, Tampere University, Tampere University School of Management, Faculty Member. Daria Krivonos, inna Perheentupa, Saara Sarma. International Feminist Journal of Politics, Volume 21, 2019 - Issue 3, 11-28-18. “Smashing containers, queering the international through collaging,” accessed 07-21-2022)//sfs

The term queer lacks a straightforward definition. While there are multiple queer traditions, it is possible to argue that three key components underpin most queer perspectives: queer theory, radical activism and gender or gay/lesbian studies (Wickman 2016). However, the term queer is not just another signifier of sexual difference; as a social science notion, it is a broader notion than a synonym for non-heterosexuals. Halberstam argues that queer should be used to mark radical models of sexual politics, “it is important to resist using [it] as an umbrella term for sexual minorities” (Halberstam 2000, 632) or as “an object to be studied” as Richter-Montpetit emphasizes. The radical contingency of queer perspectives distinguishes them from those LGBT perspectives that assume that a (liberal) rights-seeking subject is pre-formed before entering the political field. Refusing to assume such a stable subject, queer perspectives are able to inquire into subject-making as a political process. While sexuality, gender and desire are seen to play a normalizing role in this process, they are examined as a part of wider power relations. This extends IR queer inquiries to also address questions related to racism, imperialism, transphobia, and so on (Richter-Montpetit 2018). The fact that queering is not limited to theorizing sexual identifications is crucial for the attempt to smash containers (Wilcox 2014). We understand queering as a way of thinking and doing – or an analytical category – that resists “proper objects” and avoids exclusionary moves that could be made to signify monolithically (Richter-Montpetit and Weber 2017). Sjoberg characterizes queer as something that is unsettleable, uncaging and engaged in projects of destruction (Sjoberg 2014, 608). The theme of smashing is also present in Richter-Montpetit’s (2018, 3) argument that queer analytics “crack open for investigation” such dimensions of social life and international politics that have been overlooked or misunderstood by mainstream approaches: “Queer analytics have produced insights not only on the political character of sexual norms and logics, but also offer a more expansive notion of the political in IR” (Richter-Montpetit 2018, 3; see also Wilcox 2016). We argue in this article that collaging provides one possibility to acknowledge and visualize such a more expansive notion of the political. Collaging is a form of inquiry that can make visible alternative spaces of justice across various power political dividing lines, spaces that are relational, multiscalar and non-fixed. Arguably, this enables moving beyond forms of methodological nationalism that take nation-states as containers for analysis (see also Wimmer and Schiller 2002). National imaginaries can dominate analyses of sexuality and gender, for example, by creating binary oppositions between “gender equal” vs. “traditional” national societies. At classes where collages were made, we also discussed the ways in which methodologically nationalist thinking easily forms part of debates on the politics of sexuality and how such debates often assume certain binaries. However, the politics of gender and sexuality are frequently analyzed through, within or across national framings. Despite Lauren Berlant and Elizabeth Freeman’s suggestion that queer theorizing’s consent to national normativity must be made provisional (Berlant and Freeman 1993), this may also be the case in queer studies (e.g., Essig 1999). In these discussions, similarities within nationally defined groups are emphasized and differences are identified across state borders. Space is thought about in absolute terms, as a container: it is seen to contain things in the same way as any container contains things. As Berlant and Warner emphasize, queer theorizing challenges us here: It prompts imagining the “world” in terms other than containers, such as established communities or groups: “The queer world is a space of entrances, exits, unsystematized lines of acquaintance, projected horizons, typifying examples, alternate routes, blockages, incommensurate geographies” (Berlant and Warner 1998, 558). Collaging, as we argue in this article, enables crafting such a world into being. The point of the collaging exercise is not to deny the power and influence of states and nation-states in the politics of gender and sexuality but rather to see and imagine other spaces of justice across and beyond national borders. Despite this, some of the collages reproduce the idea of a nation-state as the framework within which politics of gender and sexuality are examined. As one of the participants of the workshop (to be discussed later on) wrote, in my collage, I critiqued the narrow role reserved for Finnish women and the heteronormative assumptions – as well as the assumption of whiteness. But I did not for a minute problematize the fact that by doing that I actually took an imaginary “nation” as the subject of my collage. In the next section we discuss the epistemological potential of collages to trouble container images.

## AT//aff framework

#### Exclusion DA--Disciplinary International Relations excludes queer perspectives

**Weber 14** (Cynthia Weber, Professor of International Relations at Sussex University, European Journal of International Relations 04-03-2014, “Why is there no Queer International Theory?,” http://ejt.sagepub.com/content/early/2014/04/02/1354066114524236)//sfs

My claim is that the presumed non-existence of Queer International Theory cannot be explained merely by its absence from prestigious IR journals and book series because this absence is the (un)conscious effect of how so-called Disciplinary IR codes various types of theory as failures. ‘Disciplinary IR’ — which aspires to be but is not equivalent to the discipline of IR as a whole — is, of course, as imagined as it is enacted, and it changes as social, cultural, economic, and political forces change. Yet, at any particular historical moment, IR scholars have a working knowledge of Disciplinary IR because it embodies the general commitments and standards that regulate, manage, and normalize ‘the conduct of conduct’ (Foucault, 1994: 237) regarding IR publishing, funding, hiring, promotion, and tenure decisions. While there are certainly institutional and national variations in how these standards are enacted (Hoffmann, 1977; Waever, 1998), most IR academics are required to justify their work with regard to these standards at some point in their careers.

Disciplinary IR’s commitments and standards are as much the performative result of so-called ‘mainstream’ agendas of learned societies, universities, independent funding agencies, and governments that support socially, culturally, economically, or politically ‘policy-relevant,’ ‘useful,’ or ‘impactful’ research as they are the performative outcome of so-called ‘dissident’ practices (Ashley and Walker, 1990; also see Soreanu, 2010) that seek to rewrite, resist, or rebel against so-called mainstream agendas, be they ‘scientific,’ ‘positivist,’ or ‘neoliberal,’ for example. Together, these intricately intertwined positions produce a Disciplinary IR that claims to speak for the whole of the discipline of IR because it wields sufficient power to (de)legitimate IR scholars and their work for many user communities. Because of its power, Disciplinary IR is as often contested as it is assimilated to by IR scholars of virtually all intellectual dispositions.4

A central tenet of what I am calling Disciplinary IR is embedded in the work of Martin Wight. Wight claimed that for international theorizing to succeed, it must accumulate knowledge about interstate relations (Smith, 2000; Wight, 1966). My claim is that from a Disciplinary IR perspective, theories — including queer international theories — fail because they are judged not to be making progress toward this goal. This is what explains the subsequent absence of queer international theories from prestigious IR journals and book series and the presumed non-existence of Queer International Theory.

To substantiate this claim, I investigate how Disciplinary IR employs three strategies — homologization, figuration, and gentrification — to make it appear as if there is no Queer International Theory. Homologization describes the act of using a homology to describe relationships, relative positions, and structures in a set of elements in order to prescribe how relationships ought to be ordered and how elements and their aims ought to be valued (e.g. Wight, 1966).5 Figuration describes the act of employing semiotic tropes that combine knowledges, practices, and power to shape how we map our worlds and understand actual things in those worlds (Haraway, 1997). Gentrification describes the replacement of mix with homogeneity while pretending difference and privilege do not exist (Schulman, 2012b).

My analysis is grounded in Martin Wight’s famous homology: ‘Politics is to International Politics as Political Theory is to Historical Interpretation’ (Wight, 1966).This is not only because Wight’s homology illustrates and/or authorizes homologization, figuration, and gentrification. It is also because Wight’s homology elegantly encapsulates how Disciplinary IR has traditionally thought of itself since its formation in the wake of the First World War — as separate but parallel to the discipline of politics and as capable of achieving its aim to produce unique cumulative knowledge about international politics only if it models itself on how political theory is practiced. In the 1960s, Wight mobilized this generalized view to make his case for a historical approach to the study of IR — both as a participant in the first ‘great debate’ over method and methodology between traditionalists and behavioralists and as a historian who founded an International Relations department. This in part accounts for Wight’s contentious claim that international theory can only succeed if it transforms itself into historical interpretation and his contentious placement of the term ‘Historical Interpretation’ in the place one would expect to find the term ‘International Theory’ in his homology. IR debates about methodology and history have certainly moved on since Wight’s time (e.g. Lapid, 1989; Rosenberg, 2006). Even so, the values and relationships expressed in Wight’s homology are still widely accepted in Disciplinary IR, to the point that Wight’s homology remains a generalizable guide to regulating how international theorizing ought to be conducted.

Beginning with Martin Wight’s homology, I trace how Wight’s strategy of homologization equates international theory and the discipline of International Relations with failure, authorizes the figuration of specific types of international theory and specific ways of producing international theory as failures, and embraces a gentrified strategy of substitution as a legitimate response to these failures. Applying these logics to queer international theories, I suggest that homologization, figuration, and gentrification combine to make it appear as if there is no Queer International Theory. In so doing, they authorize the discipline of IR (on Disciplinary IR’s behalf) to dismiss queer international theories as International Theory, resulting in negative consequences not only for the scholars who produce this type of work, but for the discipline of IR as a whole.

I conclude by reflecting on the costs of using Wight’s homology to regulate, manage, and normalize the scholarly conduct of international theorizing — for queer international theories and for the discipline of IR as a whole. I argue that while most scholars in the discipline (un)consciously embrace Wight’s homology as their guide to disciplinary success, my analysis of Queer International Theory reveals that Wight’s homology has three detrimental effects on the discipline: it limits how international politics is enriched by critical inquiry, it cedes consideration of key international phenomena to other disciplines, and it paradoxically leads to disciplinary failure on the discipline’s own terms.

Because the case of Queer International Theory illustrates how Disciplinary IR manages not just queer international theories, but all theories that profess to be International Theory, generalizable lessons can be drawn from this case for the discipline as a whole. Primary among these is that IR’s disciplinary attachment to Wight’s homology compromises possibilities for doing international theorizing and thinking international politics not only on terms the discipline rejects, but on terms the discipline embraces.

## AT//perm

#### Homonationalism DA – the perm is a thinly veiled attempt to include queer theorizing in IR when in reality it recreates Homonationalism

**Nayak 14** – PhD in Political Science at University of Minnesota and an Associate Professor at Pace University [Meghana, December 2014, Thinking About Queer International Relations’ Allies. International Studies Review, doi: 10.1111/misr.12188, Wiley]

What does it mean to be an ally to not only communities mobilizing for justice but also to a ﬁeld of study/scholars? I contend that this question is vital and pivotal as we try to grapple with Queer International Relations (IR)/Global Queer Studies’ relationship with the IR discipline. In the context of academic institutions and practices, I see “allies” as those who may not regularly cite, rely upon, study, teach, or participate in a particular ﬁeld of studies but are interested and invested in the development and endurance of that scholarship. But what is done to and with Queer IR by allies? Are ally politics aiming to deconstruct, dismantle, and radically transform the very systems of which they are beneﬁciaries? Or **are allies leaving power relationships intact because they are actually uneasy with, dismissive of, or unclear about Queer IR theorizing?** Scholars working in queer studies, critical race studies, or on allegedly “peripheral” topics have increasingly questioned the politics of their so-called allies, among students, faculty, administration, and the profession as a whole (Carver 2009; Ahmed 2012; Gutierrez y Muhs, Niemann, Gonzalez, and Harris 2012). Perhaps, for some, being an ally means establishing queer-friendly credentials, so they might support the work of a scholar who does Queer IR or devote a week of attention in their IR class to Global Queer Studies to illustrate the “diversity” of IR theories. Or, they might enfold Queer IR insights within slightly “safer” research agendas, such as “human rights.” But **how far are they willing to go in creating space for Queer IR to challenge how IR is performed, or how marginalized scholars are treated as different, anomalies, and incompetent?**Anecdotal evidence reveals that scholars doing Queer IR, like other marginalized academics, face troubling encounters on blogs and Facebook pages, in conferences, job search committees, tenure and promotion committees, and reviews of journal articles and manuscripts. These interactions **include thinly veiled homophobia or transphobia, scornful dismissal of queer studies as “not rigorous enough” or “not legitimate,” and attempts to make deviant and intolerable those doing Queer IR**(Weber 2014b). But “well meaning” self-proclaimed allies in ﬁelds such as Feminist IR, Global Politics, or Postcolonial IR may also participate in acts of exclusion and dismissal, even as these very scholars may ﬁnd their allies, including in queer studies, “don’t get it.” In interrogating resistance by not only those adamantly opposed to but also alleged/potential allies of Queer IR, I have been contemplating Queer IR’s promise (and threat) of revealing the instability of IR as a discipline. I contend that it is not just in the mainstream-alternative approaches debate but also in the acts of alleged solidarity and support that we see how tenuously IR operates. My hope is that we do a better job in interrogating ally politics among and between various communities of scholars. In my classes, I have unsurprisingly discovered that many of my students hold a perception that there is a difference between international LGBTQ activism and Queer IR theory. The latter, they claim, is “elitist” and inaccessible. Many queer or allied students see themselves and their struggles as intimately connected with queerness, circumscribed as identity politics or the implementation of rights for “sexual minorities.” When we discuss examples of gay rights movements or trans-rights movements around the world, they respond favorably, understanding such attempts for social justice within a human-rights framework of perpetrator/victim. But when I assign readings that I think of as Queer IR/ Global Studies, regarding **homonationalism** (Puar 2005, 2007), postcolonial and global antiracist engagement with queerness (Hawley 2001), and heteronormative and cis-normative ontologies underlying global politics and statecraft (Cohn 1987; Weber 1994a,b, 1998a,b, 1999, 2002, 2014a; Richter-Montpetit 2007; Agathangelou et al. 2008; Canaday 2011; Rao 2012; Sjoberg, this forum), many (not all) students see the work, or at least parts of it, as divisive, inaccessible, and even “dangerous” for the “real struggles” of queer communities. It is not uncommon that students may cling to a perceived praxis/theory divide. I see it when I teach feminist theory and try to push past discussions on sexual violence prevention or reproductive rights to also include postcolonial or black feminist theory. I see it when I teach human rights and try to move the conversation beyond successful international criminal legal cases to questioning the very premises of human rights discourses. A signiﬁcant number of students are indeed willing to sit with the discomfort of acting toward justice while simultaneously questioning and challenging what motivates and counts as “action” and “justice.” However, the **students who show resistance** want to see IR as a ﬁeld with terminology, jargon, and “skills” to master so that they can “do something” in the real world to protect people from persecution and harm. **Anything else seems too negative, too threatening to their relationship to the IR discipline**, which to them holds the promise of allowing them to “understand” global politics and to become career professionals in changing the world. The same students who might excitedly read Feminist IR scholarship or human rights work on sexual minorities, balk or seem taken aback when I mention Queer IR or Queer Global Studies, thinking that this scholarship belongs in some strange, otherworldly “theory” universe. Yet, they would call themselves allies, or part of the “movement” for LGBTQ rights.Optional card—can also be an impact to the K

#### Optional card—can also be read as an impact to the K-- homonationalism expels racial and sexual others from politics

Puar 07 (Jasbir Puar, PhD in ethnic studies, Duke University Press. 2007, “Terrorist assemblages: Homonationalism in queer times.” Pg2)//sfs

National recognition and inclusion, here signaled as the annexation of homosexual jargon, is contingent upon the **segregation** and **disqualification** of **racial and sexual others** from the national imaginary. At work in this dynamic is a form of sexual exceptionalism—the emergence of national homosexuality, what I term ‘‘homonationalism’’—that corresponds with the coming out of the exceptionalism of **American empire.** Further, this brand of homosexuality operates as a **regulatory script** not only of normative gayness, queerness, or homosexuality, but also of the racial and national norms that reinforce these sexual subjects. There is a commitment to the global dominant **ascendancy of whiteness** that is implicated in the propagation of the United States as empire as well as the alliance between this propagation and this brand of homosexuality. The fleeting sanctioning of a national homosexual subject is possible, not only through the proliferation of sexual-racial subjects who invariably fall out of its narrow terms of acceptability, as others have argued, but more significantly, through the simultaneous engendering and disavowal of populations of sexual-racial others who need not apply. In what follows I explore these three imbricated manifestations—sexual exceptionalism, queer as regulatory, and the ascendancy of whiteness—and their relations to the production of terrorist and citizen bodies. My goal is to present a dexterous portrait, signaling attentiveness to how, why, and where these threads bump into each other and where they weave together, resisting a mechanistic explanatory device that may cover all the bases. In the case of what I term ‘‘U.S. sexual exceptionalism,’’ a narrative claiming the successful management of life in regard to a people, what is noteworthy is that an exceptional form of national heteronormativity is now joined by an exceptional form of national homonormativity, in other words, homonationalism. Collectively, they continue or extend the project of U.S. nationalism and imperial expansion endemic to the **war on terror**. The terms of degeneracy have shifted such that homosexuality is no longer a priori excluded from nationalist formations. I unearth the forms of regulation im- homonationalism and biopolitics 3 plicit in notions of queer subjects that are transcendent, secular, or otherwise exemplary as resistant, and open up the question of queer re/production and regeneration and its contribution to the project of the optimization of life. The ascendancy of whiteness is a description of biopolitics pro√ered by Rey Chow, who links the violence of liberal deployments of diversity and multiculturalism to the ‘‘**valorization of life**’’ alibi that then allows for rampant exploitation of the very subjects included in discourses of diversity in the first instance. I elucidate how these three approaches to the study of sexuality, taken together, suggest a trenchant rereading of biopolitics with regard to queerness as well as the intractability of queerness from biopolitical arrangements of life and death.

#### Closet DA—The permutation is a form of intimidation that forces queer visibility and dictates what voices are heard and not heard.

**Sjoberg 2020** (Laura Sjoberg, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida, in “The Routledge Handbook to Rethinking Ethics in International Relations” 06-09-2020, “Trans\* theorizing for ethics in International Relations” doi: https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315613529)//sfs

Judith Butler, in Precarious Life, made the argument that, in **neoliberal capitalist imperium**,1 ‘**dissent is quelled**, in part, **through threatening the speaking subject with uninhabitable identifcation’** (2006, xix), given that a **dissenter must choose silence over being labelled treasonous or communist or some other label that has an unbreakable identifcation** with evil in contemporary Western political performance.This catch-22, Butler argues, limits not only what we can hear, what we can see and what we can mourn, but also how we live, which she frames (in Levinas’ terms) as ‘the surplus of every sociality over every solitude’ (2006, 128). Butler argues that it is the over-infusement and policing of meaning, which serves not only the performative function of constituting human experience as such but also the regulatory function of rendering uninhabitable (deemed) unacceptable political space.Trans\* theorizing has suggested that the trans\* is treated as such an uninhabitable space that is nonetheless inhabited. **Most of that discussion takes place in terms of outness and visibility. Being ‘out’ is a (controversial) concept that, in gay/queer/trans\* communities, discusses the acknowledgment of one’s gender identity/sexuality/sexual preference to one’s friends, family, or community**. In trans\* theorizing, th**e controversy can be even stronger, because some would argue that being ‘out’ is a contradiction for the trans\* because it implies something ‘in’**—a secret, or hidden truth.A trans\* man is a man, there’s no outness as trans\* because the trans\* is not an essential part of the person’s identity as a man—**it is not a secret, or a hidden truth, but just an identity**. Others suggest that outness requires an audience, but ‘it is common, that is, for non-trans people to neither know or care about the existence of trans-people’ (Shotwell and Sangray 2009, 59).This sometimes-invisibility, though, is paired with a sometimes-hypervisibility. Hypervisible things are things that are the object of gaze, fascination and/or sensationalism and abjection. In these contexts, Butler (1993, 227) characterized outness as a class privilege, looking for who has outness as ‘a historically available and affordable option’. On the one hand, some people and actors in global politics have the privilege of the visibility of the ‘true’ self, and others cannot or will not be heard (e.g., Spivak 1988). On the other hand, if visibility can be a privilege, **hypervisibility can be deeply problematic and frequently dangerous**. Moreno (2008, 140–141) suggests that there are ‘different dimensions of (in)visibility as an analytical category,’ including the individual/collective dichotomy, the universal/particular dichotomy and questions of cultural representation. In Moreno’s (2008) analysis, ‘group “outness” might actually present a condition of impossibility for individual “outness” or individual counternarratives to the dominant group narrative’ (Sjoberg 2012). If being trans\* is the process of becoming or recognizing **who one is rather than changing who one is, then the visibility of a trans\* narrative** would be problematic for the experiences of individual trans\* persons. Furthermore, visibility as trans\* has been argued to ‘reinscribe the position that genitalia are the essential determinants of sex’ (Bettcher 2007, 50) by suggesting that some transformation is necessary to make someone with female sex organs into a man, rather than recognizing that the person was always and already a man.‘Trans-theorists express concern that the continued emphasis on difference between how trans-people look and what they “are” is “fundamental to transphobic representations”’ (Sjoberg 2012, 345; citing Bettcher 2007, 50). **It is precisely the understanding that there is something to see/make visible in the trans\* that creates a politics of hypervisibility of the trans\*.** What happens is that ‘visibility yields a position in which what one is doing is represented as make-believe’ while ‘to opt for invisibility … generates the effect of revelation, exposure, or hidden truth’ (Bettcher 2007, 50).Visibility creates hypervisibility, which leads to the potential for the violent enforcement of sameness; invisibility creates silence, which leads to the potential for the violent assumption of sameness. In other words, there are violences of invisibility/exclusion (Bettcher 2007) and violences of hypervisibility/inclusion (Haritaworn, Kuntsman and Posocco 2013) that trans\* theory both illuminates and provides some instruction for navigating. Sometimes, placing a person in a group (e.g.,‘citizens’ or ‘patriots’) creates a set of expectations of that person which might feel as unnatural as exclusion if not more so (e.g., particular behaviours or observations). Demands for conformity with dress, values and/or behaviours pressure those who are included, with sometimes violent results. **So what implications for ethics in global politics can be found in this discussion of visibility? First, it contributes a suggestion that our interpretation of visibility for ethics purposes should be more complicated**.Visibility and recognition are often either implicitly or explicitly considered in dichotomous terms—where someone (or someone’s rights, or someone’s status) is either seen or unseen, recognized or unrecognized.Trans\* theorizing suggests that there are several more statuses—in addition to visible and invisible, there are situations of hypervisibility; situations of outness but invisibility; situations of visibility without outness. These statuses are not only applicable to trans\* bodies in global politics; there are many complicated situations of not only who and what can be seen, but of what the material and ethical implications of visibility are/can be.A potential application of these expanded categories might be in the debate and discussion about when/if confict sexual violence is invisible (e.g., Henry 2010; MacKinnon 2006), and when/if confict sexual violence is too visible (e.g., Buss 2007; Eisenstein 2003). Both/and (e.g., Weber 2016) hypervisibility/invisibility can and do coexist, and that complication is necessary for ethical analysis of seeing/recognizing confict sexual violence (see, e.g., my discussion in Sjoberg 2016). **Second, trans\* theorizing’s contributions to thinking about visibility suggests that ethical analysis about global politics needs to take account of the moral implications of different visibilities in more complicated ways**.T**hinking about visibility and recognition as ethical goods is** (and must be) **oversimplifed. Instead, it is important to start asking questions about what it means to be seen**, what dimensions of a person or group are seen, who benefts from and who is harmed by certain recognitions, and what implications about naturalness and truth are inherent in any given visibility and/or invisibility. In trans\* theorizing, the recognition as ‘really an x’ or ‘really a y’ can be either liberating (when the ‘x’ or ‘y’ matches the person’s understanding of self and recognition is desirable), mundane or annoying (when the ‘x’ or ‘y’ matches the person’s understanding of self, but blending in is more desirable), or torturous and violent (when the ‘x’ or ‘y’ does not match the person’s understanding of self).All of these are different moral situations, with different moral implications that need to be evaluated. **Finally, trans\* theorizing about visibility framing ‘outness’ or even** (contingent) **truth as a privilege suggests for ethics in global politics that revisiting the debate about what voices can be heard** (e.g., Spivak 1988) **and how the invisibility of certain persons and/or groups in global politics affects the dimensions that ethical thinkers see in the problems that they analyze** (e.g., Hansen 2000). **It is not just that some voices are seen and heard and others are not, it is also that the seeing and hearing of some voices costs those voices, especially in certain situations of external consumption. So two dimensions are important to consider: which voices are being heard,** and what are the costs of visibility to marginalized voices in global politics? How are the costs of visibility to be factored into thinking about diversity, rights and security when substantive ethical calculations are to be had? While it is beyond the scope of this chapter to resolve these questions, they are questions that trans\* theorizing inspires with broad applicability to ethical thinking in global politics.

# 2AC---AT: Queer IR

#### Queer IR doesn’t explain international relations.

Currah 14 — Paisley Currah, Professor of Political Science and Gender Studies at Brooklyn College, 2014 (“The State,” *TSQ: Transgender Studies Quarterly,* Vol. 1, No. 1-2, Accessible Online via e-Duke Journals Scholarly Collection, Accessed On 07-13-2016)

According to Gilles Deleuze, a concept ‘‘should express an event rather than an essence’’ (1995: 14). Molar, large-scale accounts of sex and the state have assumed a sameness to sex and a singular rationality to state actors, decisions, and projects. If the state is not unitary, coordinated, and hierarchically organized in an ultimately rational way—if, as Michel Foucault suggests, ‘‘the state is only a composite reality and a mythicized abstraction whose importance is much less than we think’’ (1991: 103)— then it should come as no surprise that state definitions of sex are also plural. A contradiction is something that does not make sense, a position that is logically inconsistent. To begin by letting go of the assumption that there is any ‘‘there there,’’ any whatness, to (legal) sex apart from what an agency says it is, the contradiction evaporates. The official sex designation—or, more precisely, the M or the F— stamped on documents or coded in records becomes the starting point. Then an analysis can focus not on what sex is, or what it should be, but on what it does, what it accomplishes, what it produces. Indeed, if the only thing we know for sure about sex is what any of these many state actors say it is in any particular instance, sex will turn out to be as messy and diffuse a concept as the state. Entering into the analysis without a firm sense of what sex is or what the state is—as a priori facts, as edifices—makes the processes through which they come into being more visible. It might be better to defer attempts to resolve— theoretically or politically— the messiness in order to understand what a particular system of sex designation does for a particular state project such as recognition or redistribution (Currah, forthcoming). Of course, states should not only or always be imagined as messy, scattered nodes of local and arbitrary power arrangements. The Leviathan state’s terrible concentrated authority to impose sanctions (death, imprisonment, fines) has been the subject of theories of sovereignty for centuries. For this purpose, the most apt definition of the state begins with the simple description from Max Weber: ‘‘A human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate physical violence within a particular given territory’’ (1991: 78). To create a truly compelling account of sovereign violence and the paradox of sovereignty, one must take Weber’s definition, put question marks around ‘‘legitimate,’’ and add the observation made by scholars such as Walter Benjamin, Carl Schmitt, Hannah Arendt, Jacques Derrida, and Giorgio Agamben that the force that creates the law and makes it legitimate cannot be justified by a law that does not yet exist. Still, much of what states do— regulating the health, safety, and public welfare through myriad regulations, rules, decisions, practices— does not reach the threshold of juridical violence, even if those actions are ultimately undergirded by its threat. Fetishizing a generalized idea of the state and its terrifying or redemptive power (depending on one’s perspective) can obscure what is actually happening in the local, micro, particular sites where most public authority is exercised. While it is crucial to theorize the singular finality of state violence, neglecting to examine the messiness of actually existing and potentially incommensurate policies, practices, rules, and norms risks substituting the conceptual for the concrete and gets in the way of understanding what might actually be going on (Latour 1995: 48).

#### And, it doesn’t specify an alternative global system---that’s a precondition to any form of alt solvency---they say there are other ways to engage internationally but don’t specify what they are or how they are superior---“negation in every instance” is not an advocacy.

Dillon Tatum 18. Assistant professor in the Department of Political Science and Geography at Francis Marion University. “Toward a Radical IR.” Duck of Minerva. 11/28/2018. <http://duckofminerva.com/2018/11/toward-a-radical-ir.html>

David Brook’s latest column in the New York Times, banging on the same themes about “the kids are just not right,” raises some questions about what it means to engage in radical politics in the Trump era. Brooks compares the younger generation’s belief “that the system itself is rotten and needs to be torn down” to accomodationist and gradualisms. He continues on to speculate about how these new attitudes might affect older, more “pragmatic,” liberals who desire to work within the system. Brooks, as usual, uses a conservative argument to position himself in the “middle.” I have been thinking a lot about this issue of “radicalism” contra arguments about working within systems that are unjust in thinking about liberal world order and its futures. It has led me to a question I am currently exploring in a work-in-progress about what the possibilities are of radicalism as a way of approaching international politics. Against arguments like Brooks’, and even more sophisticated arguments about agonistic democracy developed by thinkers like Chantal Mouffe, I think there is a place in IR for radical conceptions of transformation, order, and politics. What is radicalism? Brooks never fully fleshes out this concept. Philosophy and political theory have engaged with the issue of radicalism as a concept, though the results are often divergent. To quote Agnes Heller, in her treatise on radical philosophy, it “can give the world a norm, and it can will people to want to give a world to the norm.” Radicalism as an idea, and as a form of critique, mobilizes many different modes of thinking about the social and the political. The most comprehensive definition of radicalism is that provided by Paul McLaughlin, who defines radicalism “in terms of (i) a fundamental orientation (toward fundamental objects) (ii) in the political domain (iii) of an argumentative nature.” More than that, though, we can add that radicalism intervenes in the political domain with the goal of fundamental transformation. Additionally, though radicalism indeed proceeds in an argumentative nature, this methodology for argument is one that is aimed at critiquing, and seeking the destruction/replacement of existing institutions. A revised working definition of radicalism, therefore, is: a way of thinking about politics that focuses on totalities, praxis and political action, and the deployment of historicist methods with an eye toward “getting to the root of things.” Thus, radicalism is both a broad range of critical thought and practice, but also is specific in the realms of focus, action, and method. If Brooks is right that there is a major clash between a radical younger generation and a more pragmatic and moderate older generation in American politics, these differences are not well expressed in contemporary thinking about IR. Some of the biggest divisions are between what Robert Cox called “problem-solving theories” and theories that critique such approaches, but provide little argumentation aimed at tearing structures of injustice down altogether. In short: IR, even at its critical ends, is not radical (for an excellent exception see here and here). Why is this important? This morning, I taught a seminar on the question “Is Liberal World Order Finished?” I asked my students to think about what makes a liberal order “liberal,” and then asked: “Can we fix the liberal world order, or can we imagine a world without it?—and what would that look like?” The students were quick to point out the violences, inequities, and problems inherent in a liberal world order, but it took a good bit of pushing and prodding to get them to articulate whether/how we should/could take this order apart and rethink it. This was not just a difficult task for the students—it is something IR has not spent enough time meditating on.

There is a lot to be critical of these days. And, I disagree with Brooks’s pessimism about a younger radical generation. Politics is deeply intertwined with engagements with radicalism. What I think is missing when we consider global politics, though, is that many of our pressing questions about institutions, order, and state action proceed from the same sort of moderation, accomodationism, or—at the most—an immanently critical vein. If we want to intellectually and politically approach issues like: What do we make of the future(s) of liberal world order? IR needs to engage with radicalism.

#### Alt fails—Trump era cemented heteronormative views within politics, cooption inevitable

**Weber 16** (Cynthia Weber, Professor of International Relations at the University of Sussex, “Sovereignty, Sexuality And The Will To Trump: A Queer IR Analysis And Response,” 11-27-2016, accessed 07-21-2022, https://thedisorderofthings.com/2016/11/27/sovereignty-sexuality-and-the-will-to-trump-a-queer-ir-analysis-and-response/)//sfs

Crucially, the Trump campaign didn’t just roll out its vision of this ‘US sovereign subject’ by employing either/or logics, even though much of the time this seemed to be the case. Yes, Trump pitted ‘trustworthy’ and ‘untrustworthy’ US citizens against one another. But he constantly flip flopped on who these trustworthy and untrustworthy citizens were, whether in the case of women, ‘the blacks’ or the first black President of the United States of America. The campaign also rolled out Mike Pence to deny many of the things Trump said. And Trump made a lot of inherently contradictory statements that suggested he was for and against some groups or policies at the same time. For example, Trump said, ‘There can be no discrimination against gays. I’m against gay marriage’ (although in his 60 Minutes interview, Trump said gay marriage was a legally settled issue). Trump also made inconsistent statements about the anti-trans\* bathroom law in North Carolina. Comments like these were implicitly and explicitly made in the register of sex, gender and sexuality throughout the campaign, and they were more consistent with and/or logics and neither/nor logics than they were with either/or logics. These statements demonstrate how some of **the paradoxical figures and logics found in queer discourses were coopted** by the Trump campaign for its own purposes. All of this left many politicians, pundits, and ordinary US American citizens wondering if Trump was a clown who should be laughed off or an existential threat to the American democratic project. Trump positioned himself as either and both and even neither as it suited his ambitions. And he will likely continue to do so as the 45th President of the United States. What is to be done? As the US and the world face up to the realities of the impossible Presidency that the Trump campaign made possible, there is no shortage of recommendations circulating in critical camps about what is to be done. These include: Organizing new coalitions and devising experimental techniques to make them effective; **Disarming** the **specific modalities of citizenship, governance and reason** that make (un)reasonable identifications with a will to Trump possible; and **Resisting all** xenophobias, forms of **racism**, **misogyny**, **homo/bi/trans\*phobias**, and other oppressive ideologies and social relations that violently order the world in whatever name – be it **white supremacy**, **rightwing nationalism**, conservatism, or **neoliberalism**. I am less hopeful than Joan Cocks might be that these new political alliances and institutions will be forged ‘without sovereign aspirations, delusions, or pretensions’, **whatever their scale**. And I may be more persuaded than Cocks is that the counter-Trump re-imaginings of the US that will support these political alliances and institutions are **an essential part of what makes radical change possible, even if these re-imaginings fail to escape the ‘delusion of sovereignty’ and its corresponding delusions of things like sex, gender and sexuality**. This, it seems to me, is something **Trump’s radical re-imagining of the US as his platform for winning the White House underscores**. As we all move forward and ready ourselves for some difficult conversations, this queer IR analysis suggests we keep the following two points in mind. First, connections between sovereignty, sex, gender and sexuality are neither academic nor trivial. Nor are they separable from racisms, xenophobias and other systems of power. How sovereignties are specifically sexualized, racialized, classed and otherwise configured to authorize the defense of particular nationalisms and internationalisms has real effects on real people. This is as true in relation to the hate speech and physical violence authorized in the name of Trump as it is for the policies that will emerge from a Trump administration. Second, **exclusively anti-normative, always contrarian, somehow liberating understandings** of ‘queer’, ‘queers’, and ‘queer logics’ can **obscure** the fact that ‘queer’ – just like **any (dis)position, strategy, or tool – can be captured, mimicked, and mobilized** to map the world in despicable ways. **Alt-Right** offers one important example of a white supremacist organization **adopting techniques of the left** for such purposes. How the Trump campaign **mobilized what (otherwise) might appear to be queer logics of statecraft to de-normalize Clinton’s ‘neoliberal US sovereign subject’ on behalf of Trump’s (re)normalized ‘repressed, entitled, white US sovereign subject’** is another. **There is no reason to believe that, as President, Trump will abandon the very logics and tactics that helped win** him the Presidency. These are among the stakes a queer IR analysis of a will to Trump makes plain. For me, **opposing a will to Trump** starts by reminding myself that – like ‘queer’ – a ‘state’s sovereign subjectivity is…”[i]llusive, always on the move.” It is “at best like something, but it never is that something”’. Trump is of some ever-changing United States of America, but Trump is not the United States of America. The same can be said of the ‘US sovereign subject’ Trump’s campaign strategically figured to authorize Trump’s will to power. It is in these gaps and fissures where I will pitch my political tent and stage my **practical political resistance** to a will to Trump.

#### Alt Fails — rethinking doesn’t change material conditions.

**Cocks 16** — Joan Cocks, Emeritus Professor of Politics and Co-Founder of the Program in Critical Social Thought at Mount Holyoke College, holds a Ph.D. from the University of Massachusetts-Amherst, 2016 (“Queer International Relations (II),” The Disorder of Things—a scholarly blog, November 22nd, Available Online at <https://thedisorderofthings.com/2016/11/22/queer-international-relations-ii/>, Accessed 02-06-2020)

Although he/she stands as an emblem of Cynthia’s hope for pluralizing the monolithic concept of sovereign man and for queering an integrated Europe, I’m going to gesture only briefly to the border-straddling Eurovision song contest winner Neuwirth/Wurst. I have to confess that I’ve never watched Eurovision and so must trust Cynthia’s reading of N/W entirely, but as she depicts him/her, unlike the normal homosexual, this bearded lady from Austria and Colombia managed to provoke wildly clashing reactions from leaders and peoples in different countries and of different political stripes by impaling him/herself on the border of masculine and feminine, the Global North and Global South, secularism and religion, white and brown racial identities, and national particularity and regional integration. Still, while Cynthia’s layered reading of N/W is as sophisticated an interpretation of identity deconstruction as any cultural theorist could hope for, **a performance of ambiguities in identity on stage**, **and the parsing of those ambiguities in a queer IR theory text**, **can push the world forward** (or, to the minds of N/W’s critics, backward) **only so far**.

### perm

#### The perm allows for queer sensibility through more incorporation of queerness in IR

**Amoureux 15** – Scholar postdoctoral fellow at Wake Forest University; received his PhD from Brown University in Political Science [Jack, 2015, “Queer Ethics of World Politics”, Academia.edu]

In summarizing some of these themes, controversies and tensions, I am unavoidably reading queer theory as an IR scholar steeped in a literature that, for the most part, has not accepted and has even been actively hostile to a ‘queer IR’ (Weber 2014b). Nevertheless, an **intersection of queer and ‘dominant’ IR is potentially fruitful**, but it is not a matter of ‘mixing and stirring’ since the **queer has been relevant to IR and world politics all along**, in its dominant narratives of discipline as they extend through the halls of power, products of media and culture, and the offices, conference rooms and journals of the field of International Relations (Weber 2013; 2014a, 2014b; Wilcox 2015). In other words, I am interrogating IR from a body of literature that has become known as ‘queer theory’ but this effort should not be read as a neglect of the ways in which a growing contingent of IR scholars have read world politics through a queer lens to make up a rich variety of critical and innovative approaches